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The Rule of Reasonableness In Constitutional
Adjudication: Toward The End of Irre-
sponsible Judicial Review And The
Establishment of A Viable Theory
of The Equal Protection Clause
By JEFFREY M. SHAMAN*
Introduction
In the realm of constitutional law it is familiar doctrine that the
Supreme Court will not declare legislation to be unconstitutional unless
it is shown to be clearly unreasonable. According to this doctrine,
which might be referred to as the Rule of Reasonableness, the Court
will presume that legislation is constitutional until its unconstitutionality
can be demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt. The Rule of Rea-
sonableness has had a persistent, if at times irregular, application to a
variety of constitutional subjects,' and it has enjoyed a wide acceptance
among Supreme Court justices as well as constitutional scholars.2 In
* Associate Professor of Law, De Paul University College of Law. B.A., Penn-
sylvania State University; J.D., University of Southern California; L.L.M., Georgetown
University.
1. Examples of some of the earlier Supreme Court decisions applying the Rule
of Reasonableness are: Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879); Sinking-Fund
Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878); Legal-Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531
(1870); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827); Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810). Later Supreme Court decisions applying the Rule
are cited at notes 17, 19, 26 and 28 infra.
2. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) [hereinafter cited as Thayer]; C.E. HUGHES,
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES 37 (1928); C. WARREN, CoNGRESs, Thm
CONSTrTUTrON AND THE SuPREME CoURT 203 (1935); P. Freund, "Review of Facts in
Constitutional Cases" in SuPRME COURT AND SUPREmm LAW 47 (E. Cahn ed. 1954);
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 35-44 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BICKEL];
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward, 86 H-Iv. L. REv. 1, 20-24 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Gunther]; see also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
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many areas of constitutional law the Rule of Reasonableness produces
profound consequences, and in recent years the Rule has had particu-
larly significant effect in its application to cases arising under the equal
protection clause. The Rule has been used as a device to avoid judicial
review or to obscure its exercise. Unfortunately, the Rule has been
accepted without the critical appraisal which should be given any doc-
trine with such continuously significant influence. Thus, the validity
of the Rule of Reasonableness as a recurring doctrine in constitutional
adjudication, eslecially under the equal protection clause, should be
seriously examined.
The Historical Setting of the Rule of Reasonableness
The Supreme Court's power of judicial review, first established in
Marbury v. Madison,' is a responsibility that the Court has not always
suffered gladly. There is a dialectical tension concerning the nature
of judicial review which has caused its acceptance to be quite tentative.
Judicial review is essentially undemocratic in nature; it places an awe-
some authority in the hands of a relatively small body of persons who
are virtually independent from and unaccountable to the electorate.4
Yet it is this very characteristic of judicial review that may be the source
of its greatest potential; by virtue of its independence, the Supreme
Court is able to safeguard constitutional values that otherwise might be
undermined by a tyranny of the majority.5 There would be little con-
stitutional restraint upon a majoritarian legislature that had the un-
stitutional Law, 73 HAv. L. REV. 1 (1959); but see THE LErAL CoNSCIENCE--SELECTED
PAPERS OF FEux S. COHEN 44 (L.K. Cohen ed. 1960); Miller and Howell, The Myth
of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960) [herein-
after cited as Miller and Howell].
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. See F. RODELL, Nmw MEN ch. 1, p. 36, 37 (1955).
5. One commentator goes so far as to suggest the following: '"The position of
the Constitution as supreme law of the land has made judicial review a practical neces-
sity. .. [Constitutional] limitations can be preserved in practice in no other way than
through the courts; without them, all the reservations of particular rights and privileges
amount to nothing.
"In practice, there can be no Constitution without judicial review. It provides the
only adequate safeguard that has been invented against unconstitutional legislation. It
is, in truth, the sine qua non of the constitutional structure." B. ScHw~ATz, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 4 (1972). Such a statement might well be accused of question-begging in
its assumption that only the courts properly can determine constitutionality, which is a
proposition that may or may not be so. For a more balanced and in-depth consideration
of the problem, see the sources collected in R. LOCKHART, Y. KAIs.R, AND J. CHoFRn,
CoNsnTuTUTONAL LAw 7-15 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as LOCKHART]. An even
more extensive collection of sources can be found in L. LEvy, Jut(MENTs: ESSAYS ON
AMERiCAN CONsTrITIONAL IsroRy 57-63 (1972).
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bridled authority to decide the constitutionality of its own acts. How-
ever, the justices who sit upon the Supreme Court possess both the
strengths and weaknesses of human nature, and therefore can and do
use their unaccountable authority to accomplish unpopular as well as
popular goals. Thus, it is a risk to invest the Supreme Court with the
power of judicial review. By now it is firmly established both legally
and politically that the Court does have the authority of judicial review;
nevertheless, the dialectic about judicial review continues, as does the
Court's reluctance to exercise this most significant power.
Even John Marshall, the author of Marbury and a strong supporter
of judicial supervision of the other branches of government, recognized
that judicial review could carry with it political vulnerability for the
Court. During the impeachment trial of Justice Chase-a trial moti-
vated at least in part by politcial and ideological differences with Con-
gress -Marshall went so far as to suggest that, in order to protect the
Court's integrity and personnel, perhaps the exercise of judicial review
should be subject to legislative reversal.7  And it was not until the Dred
Scott decision,8 some fifty-four years after Marbury, that the Supreme
Court again dared to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional.9
To avoid the political predicaments that can be brought on by ju-
dicial review, and perhaps also to avoid the burden of making difficult
decisions about complex constitutional issues, the Supreme Court has
devised several ways to avoid exercising its authority to review the con-
stitutionality of state and federal action. The Court has often viewed
the "case or controversy" mandate of article III not so much as 'a re-
quirement for jurisdiction but as a device to avoid the task of having
to decide constitutional issues. 10 Additionally, the Court has created
6. R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRisIs: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG RE-
PUBLIC 76-82, 91-95 (1971).
7. A. BEVERIDGE, 3 THE LiFE OF JOHN MAEsHALL 177-8 (1919). "In his letter
to his colleague Chase, Marshall offered to abandon judicial supremacy in the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution in return for security against impeachments. Yet these obvious
facts are ignored and Marshall has become a supposed model of rigorously logical
thought to what is regarded as a learned profession . . ." M. COHEN, Tm FrrH OF
A LmERAL 180 (1946).
8. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
9. C. W AmRN, CoNGRESS, TnE CONSTrTunON AND TIE SUPRE E COURT 304
(1935).
10. See Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L.
Rv. 1265 (1961); BICKEL, supra note 2, at ch. 4; Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLTJM. L. Rnv. 1 (1964); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the
Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1443 (1971).
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several rules of "abstention" which are more or less admittedly de-
signed to circumvent the adjudication of constitutional issues.,. In a
more subtle manner, the Court also has shifted the process of constitu-
tional review from its own shoulders to those of the framers of the Con-
stitution by interpreting the Constitution according to the "intent" of
the framers. 12 Some of these devices are employed openly as a means
to avoid constitutional review, while others are disguised so that this
function is not readily -apparent. Nevertheless, they all evidence a re-
luctance on the part of the Court to exercise the difficult responsibility
of constitutional decision-making.
In keeping with the Court's general reluctance to face constitu-
tional questions, the Supreme Court also has developed another doc-
trine that has had a history of utmost significance for constitutional law:
the Rule of Reasonableness. According to the Rule of Reasonable-
ness the Court must hold a presumption in favor of the constitutionality
of any law "until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt,"'" or until it is shown that the legislators "not merely
made a mistake but have made a very clear one-so clear that it is
not open to rational question."' 4 This credo has been stated in various
terms, all of which boil down to the same thing: the Court should not
strike down legislation unless the legislation is shown "beyond doubt"
to be "clearly" or "totally" "mistaken," "capricious," "irrational," or
In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Supreme Court held that under Article
III, for taxpayer standing to exist, a double nexus must be established: first, the tax-
payer must demonstrate a nexus between taxpaying status and the legislative enactment
that is challenged, and secondly, the taxpayer must demonstrate a nexus between taxpay-
ing status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. The second
nexus limits taxpayer standing to challenging legislation only upon specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the Congressional taxing and spending power.
The second nexus, as pointed out by both Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion and
Justice Harlan in his dissent, is unrelated to a litigant's standing except to the extent
that the litigant will be allowed to invoke a court's authority of judicial review; thus,
the second nexus operates more as a limitation upon the authority of the courts than
as a means to determine a litigant's actual stake in a controversy.
11. See, e.g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Louisiana Power and Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242
(1953); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Great Lakes
Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Railroad Commission v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
12. See also Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38
S. CAL. L. Rv. 1 (1965); cf. Shaman, The Use of Congressional Committee Reports
in the Administrative Process, 6 IND. L. REV. 481 (1973).
13. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 270 (1827).
14. Thayer, supra note 2, at 144.
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"unreasonable." First used by the Supreme Court in its earliest
cases, 15 the Rule of Reasonableness has been applied to a large variety
of constitutional issues, although not always in a consistent manner. It
seems to be a device for adjudication that is relied upon when it suits
the purposes of the Court and then is rejected or ignored when it does
not suit the Court's purposes. 6 For example, the Rule was promul-
gated as a principle of constitutional decision-making in one commerce
clause case,' 7 was then passed over or rejected in another case involv-
ing virtually the same commerce issue' s (both cases written, ironically,
by Justice Stone), only to be resuscitated some years later in another
case involving another issue under the commerce clause.' 9 It could be
argued with some merit that in every case of constitutional review in
which the Rule does not appear, the Court signifies disapproval of the
Rule. Nevertheless, the Rule of Reasonableness has had a long, if vac-
ilatory, endurance. It is perhaps the most recurring principle (or ra-
tionalization) of constitutional adjudication that exists.
There is no doubt that the Rule of Reasonableness has had its
most persistent application and most significant consequences in due
process20 and equal protection cases. Judicial reluctance to exercise
the power of constitutional review has been greatest when the Court
is called upon to review legislation under either of these clauses. Due
to the generality of the wording of both clauses, the potential scope of
15. See note 1 supra and cases cited therein.
16. "[TIhe 'presumption of Constitutionality' often appeared in the decisions more
as a ritual formula than as a working reality." Hurst, "Review and the Distribution of
National Powers" in SUPREmE COURT AND SUPREmE LAw 140, 156 (E. Cahn ed. 1954).
17. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)
(holding that a state statute prescribing width and weight regulations for trucks using
highways within the state did not violate the commerce clause):
"Hence, in reviewing the present determination, we examine the record, not to see
whether the findings of the court below are supported by evidence, but to ascertain upon
the whole record whether it is possible to say that the legislative choice is without ra-
tional basis." 303 U.S. at 191-2.
18. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (holding that a state
statute proscribing the maximum number of cars on trains within the state did violate
the commerce clause):
Thils Court, and the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final
arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests." 325 U.S. at 769.
19. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was within Congressional authority under the commerce clause):
"W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before
them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the pro-
tection of commerce, our investigation is at an end." 379 U.S. at 303-304.
20. Discussion of the due process clause in the text and notes refers generally to
the due process clauses of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.
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judicial review under either of them is broader than under any other
provision of the Constitution. While some justices have relished such
wide authority, others have shirked it and have used a variety of the
avoidance devices in order to relinquish exercise of their authority.
Prior to the end of the 1800's the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses were dormant as means of reviewing the substantive valid-
ity of legislation. 1 Then, around 1899, the Court began to strike down
legislation on the ground that it violated "substantive" due process.
22
By incorporating an out-moded laissez-faire economic policy into the
requirements of substantive due process, the Court invalidated many
remedial statutes that were designed to regulate wages, prices, and
working conditions. 3 With the onset of the depression, the Court by
a slim majority continued to combine economic fundamentalism and
due process of law to strike down both state and federal legislation that
had been enacted to ameliorate the urgent conditions of the depression.
When President Roosevelt responded to the Court's behavior with his
infamous "court-packing plan," it was thought that the nation was near
a constitutional crisis concerning the continued viability of the Su-
preme Court.24 But suddenly Justice Roberts had a judicial change of
heart,2 5 and a newly constituted majority of the Court was formed which
quickly set to work to save the New Deal; thus the constitutional crisis
was averted. The newly formed majority began to demolish substan-
tive due process review over economic legislation through the use of
the Rule of Reasonableness; in case after case the Court responded to
21. LOCKHART, supra note 5, at 454-5; G. GuNTHER & N. DOWirNG, CONSTrru-
TION. LAW 954-5 (1970).
22. B. WEIGHT, ThE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTrrUTONAL LAW 154 (1942).
23. E.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Ribnik v.
McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Murphy
v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); All-
geyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). It was in response to this situation that Jus-
tice Holmes made his famous riposte that "[tlhe Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
24. A. Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval 447-496 (1960).
25. It was Justice Roberts and not Chief Justice Hughes who held the one man
balance of power between the court's majority and minority:
"[N]ever once in a major case did [Hughes] cast the deciding vote; for never once
in a major case was Hughes to the right of Roberts. Thus, with five brethren to right
of him and three clearly to left, Hughes could only choose whether a conservative deci-
sion should be scored 5-4 or 6-3; he could never determine that a decision be liberal
unless Roberts, the Court's swinging keystone, came along." F. RoDELL, NRE MEN 223
(1955). See vIso A. $cHLEsIrNER, THE POL1.CS QF 1JPP1FAVAI. 464-67, 474-79 (1960).
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due process claims with the reply that "the guaranty of due process...
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or ca-
pricious .... "28
When it became apparent that substantive due process attacks
against economic legislation would no longer be accepted by the Court,
attorneys began to press equal protection claims as a hoped-for replace-
ment for substantive due process. However, the justices of the new
majority were still in a state of reaction against the manner in which
the due process clause had previously been wielded and saw the equal
protection clause as a broad, general provision much like the due proc-
ess clause, and therefore prone to the same abuses.17  The Court trans-
ferred its suspicion of the due process clause to the equal protection
clause. The Court normally held that under the equal protection
clause, no legislation would be invalidated unless it constituted discrim-
ination that was clearly "irrational" or "invidious". 28 From 1941 to
1970 there was not a single case in which the Court struck down eco-
nomic legislation as violative~of due process, and only one case, Morey
v. Doud,2 9 where the Court found economic legislation to violate the
equal protection clause.80 However, the justices soon found that their
reaction to the New Deal court crisis was too extreme, and that they
would have to retreat from their doctrinaire use of the Rule of Rea-
sonableness.
Beginning in the mid-1950's, cases began reaching the Court in
which noneconomic legislation was challenged as violating equal pro-
tection of the law. Some of these cases involved statutory classifica-
26. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). Some other examples of this
attitude are: "Legislative response to that conviction cannot be regarded as arbitrary
or capricious, and that is all we have to decide." West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 399 (1937); "[Rjegulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in light of the facts made known
or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
27. However, compare Justice Jackson's view of the equal protection clause as ex-
pressed in his concurring opinion in R.E.A. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), and
Justice Douglas' later view of the equal protection clause as expressed in his concurrence
in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
28. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See also Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963); Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family
Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); R.E.A. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
29. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
3Q. LocpL&RT, supra note 5, at 481.
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tions based on criteria such as race or national origin that the members
of the Court perceived to be constitutionally unjust." Other cases con-
cerned classifications that the justices thought were constitutionally im-
permissible because they abrogated important personal rights.32 In
order for the Court to provide the constitutional protection that the jus-
tices thought should exist in these cases, it was necessary to depart from
the Rule of Reasonableness. In doing so, the Court developed its so-
called "two-tiered" approach of "selective intervention," under which
it adhered to the Rule of Reasonableness in cases that did not involve
a "suspect" classification or "fundamental" interest but did not adhere
to it in other cases.33 In the former kind of case, the Court applied
"'minimal" (or virtually no) scrutiny to the legislation under review by
following the Rule of Reasonableness. In cases involving "suspect"
classifications or "fundamental" interests the Court applied "strict"
scrutiny to eschew the Rule of Reasonableness and review the legisla-
tion in depth.
Recently, there are some tentative indications that the Supreme
Court, with new personnel, is about to develop a somewhat different
approach to both due process and equal protection cases. There are
a few signs that the equal protection two-tiered approach may crum-
ble,3" perhaps taking with it the Rule of Reasonableness. Also, there
are signs that a kind of substantive due process may be revitalized in
a limited category of cases involving the "right of privacy," although
this revitalization seems to be proceeding along a two-tiered line similar
to the approach previously taken to regenerate equal protection review
in strict scrutiny situations. 5 Unfortunately, the Rule of Reasonable-
ness still lays heavily upon both the due process and equal protection
clauses, and any further changes in the Supreme Court's exercise of
judicial review under those provisions will only occur by dismantling
the formidable barrier of the Rule of Reasonableness.
31. The school desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), is of course the most often cited and most famous case in which the Supreme
Court held a racial classification to be unconstitutional. See also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
32. E.g., Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
33. The two-tiered approach is described in depth in Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969). See also Gunther, supra
note 2, at 8-10.
34. Gunther, supra note 2, at 10-37.
35. P. Bender, Privacies of Life, HARPER's MAGAZINE, April 1974, at 36 [herein-
after cited as Bender].
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An Analysis of the Rule of Reasonableness
and a Reply to Professor Bickel
The Rule of Reasonableness should not be taken literally because
to do so would in effect embrace the incorrect concept that there are
quantitative degrees of constitutionality. A literal interpretation of the
Rule necessarily implies that statutes may be slightly unreasonable,
somewhat unreasonable, or totally unreasonable. It is nonsense to
think of the constitutionality of statutes in quantitative terms; constitu-
tionality is a qualitative matter, and the reasonableness of legislation
is not akin to inches or pounds that can be measured in quantative de-
grees.
At best the Rule of Reasonableness is a metaphor that functions
as a caution to judges that they should hesitate to substitute their own
judgments for those of the legislature.3 6  According to this conception
of the Rule, judges should not strike down legislation unless they are
certain that the legislation is unreasonable. The Rule thus becomes
a doctrine of judicial restraint under which judges temper their power
of judicial review by the most careful deliberation.
While it is a desirable practice for judges ito be especially delib-
erate, the Rule of Reasonableness, even when understood to be only
a metaphor, produces serious deficiencies in the adjudication process.
First, the Rule can become a means by which judges totally abnegate
their responsibility of judicial review. If the Rule is -taken to be, as
Professor Bickel in his renowned book3 7 asserts that it should, a device
"to limit the area of judicial policy-making, keeping the judicial func-
tion distinct from the legislative"381 the result will be total abnegation
of the responsibility of judicial review. This is so because courts, par-
ticularly the Supreme Court, are as much policy-makers as the legisla-
ture. The judicial function is not, as Professor Bickel would have it,
distinct from the legislative function. At their foundation all rules or
36. "It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism
of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favour of its validity,
until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827).
"Full and free play must be allowed to 'that wide margin of considerations which
address themselves only to the practical judgment of a legislative body.' Moreover, ev-
ery action of the other departments embodies an implicit decision on their part that it
was within their constitutional power to act as they did. The judiciary must accord the
utmost respect to this determination, even though it be a tacit one." BICKEL, Supra note
2, at 35.
37. BICKEL, supra note 2.
38. Id. at 40.
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laws are value judgments, whether their source is the legislature, the
executive, or the judiciary. When a court reviews the constitutionality
of a statute under the equal protection clause (or any other constitu-
tional provision), the court is substituting its value judgment for that
of the legislature. Whether the court upholds or invalidates a statute,
the court is making policy, making value judgments, making the same
sort of decisions as a legislature.39 Philosophy has shown us that no
human decisional process, not even that of pure science, is value free.
Indeed, knowledge itself is "primarily decisional in nature,""0 and
therefore the result of subjective value choices.41  In this respect, the
legal process is no different from other decisional processes. More-
over, despite the law's early pretensions to allegiance with the pure sci-
ences, 42 the law has always been less a pure science than a social
science, and therefore susceptible -to an even higher degree of subjec-
tivity. Adherence to "neutral principles" or "pure reason' is an impos-
sibility.43  Although the value choices implicit in every legal decision
may be more obvious in some cases than in others, they are always
present.
Throughout the history of American constitutional development
may be found recurring evidence of the fact that Supreme Court
Justices have been motivated by value preferences in reaching de-
cisions. At no time have they resorted to neutrality or impersonal-
ity of principle in making choices between competing altcrnatives. 44
This is by no means to suggest that logic and analytic reasoning
are not indispensable tools for proper adjudication. Without logical
thinking, adjudication will go awry, but the mere presence of logic is
hardly enough; logic is but a framework that, without the foundation
of values, is incapable of producing any sort of real decision. Professor
Bickel's criticism of those persons he refers to as "neo-realists" and "ni-
39. "[I]n substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a deeper
sense than that what the courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It
is legislative in its grounds. The very considerations which judges most rarely mention,
and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices
of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community con-
cerned." O.W. HOLmEs, JR., THE COMMON LAw 35 (1881). Citing this quotation
from Justice Holmes, Professor Karst makes the claim "that the [iudicial] function is
essentially legislative in character no one now disputes." Karst, Legislative Facts in
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 75, 76 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Karst].
40. Miller and Howell, supra note 2, at 665 (emphasis in original).
41. See Shaman, Responsibility and Insanity-Do They Exist?, 31 U. PITT. L.
R v. 243, 247-254 (1969).
42. See H. S. COMMAGER, THE AmmuCAN Mum ch. XVII (1950).
43. Miller and Howell, supra note 2; contra, Wechsler, supra note 2.
44. Miller and Howell, supra note 2, at 671-2.
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hilists"' 4  for their cynicism toward logic shows that Professor Bickel
does not fully understand the nature of the cynicism. While logic is
an essential element of proper analysis, pure logic free of value judg-
ments leads nowhere in the decisional process; therefore reliance on
logic cannot be used to avoid value judgments.
Thus, when Professor Bickel claims that the Rule of Reasonable-
ness would not result in a total abdication of the power of judicial re-
view, he is contradicting his assertion that the Rule should operate to
keep the judicial function distinct from the legislative function. If the
Court uses the Rule to avoid "legislating", it thereby totally abdicates
judicial review. There can be no such thing as judicial review if the
Court is not willing to make value judgments; that is, if the Court is
not willing to "legislate." The Rule, with its emphasis on "rationality"
and "reasonableness" and with its avoidance of policy considerations,
seeks -the impossible: a means of making decisions by pure logic, free
of value judgment.
A review of the case law wherein the Rule of Reasonableness is
operative shows that, contrary to Professor Bickel's claim that the doc-
trine does not lead to a total abdication of judicial review, such abdica-
tion has occurred. In substantive due process cases involving economic
legislation, the Supreme Court readily has admitted that it uses the Rule
as a means to entirely evade judicial review. It has been the Rule of
Reasonableness, and nothing else, by which the Court has made sub-
stantive due process a deadletter in review of economic legislation.
Similarly, when the Supreme Court is using the Rule of Reasonableness
in equal protection cases, it accepts the legislative judgment that is sup-
posedly under review with virtually no critical examination. In fact,
after the New Deal Court crisis when equal protection claims were first
asserted as a replacement for the discredited substantive due process, 6
the Supreme Court intentionally used the Rule of Reasonableness to
abnegate judicial review under the equal protection clause.47 Reacting
to the recent past which had seen a misguided use of the due process
clause, and overly suspicious that the equal protection clause had an
equivalent potential for judicial mischief, the Court cursorily rejected
equal protection claims by subjecting them to essentially the same Rule
of Reasonableness by which it rejected due process claims. The result
was nullification of judicial review as far as equal protection of the law
45. BicKEL, supra note 2, at 75-84.
46. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
47. See cases cited in note 28 supra.
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was concerned. Under the sway of the Rule, the Supreme Court or-
dained that the equal protection clause only prohibited "arbitrary" or
"invidious" discrimination, and that legislative classifications need be
"merely rational" to meet the test of constitutionality. In using these
tests to uphold statute after statute (Morey v. Doud 8 is the only excep-
tion), the Court made it quite clear that it was not about to substitute
its judgment for that of the legislature. The Court upheld discrimina-
tory statutes on the rationale that the legislature "may well have con-
cluded"49 or "evidently believes"' 50 that the discrimination was justified.
However, the imagined justification that the legislature might have had
was never articulated by the Court. Often the Court upheld discrim-
inatory legislation by presuming that the legislative classification was
reasonable unless the party challenging it could "negate every conceiv-
able basis which might support it,"51 a difficult if not impossible bur-
den.5 2 Instead of meaningfully reviewing legislative classifications, the
Court perfunctorily propagated the Rule of Reasonableness; a fantasy
rationality was all that was required of the classifications. In both equal
protection and due process cases the Court refused to evaluate legisla-
tion; it completely abnegated its power of judicial review under these
two constitutional provisions, thereby rendering both the due process
clause and the equal protection clause a deadletter as far as the Court
was concerned.
By the heyday of the Warren Court, the Rule of Reasonableness
48. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
49. R.E.A. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
50. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
51. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); accord, Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973).
52. "If the (legislation) is to be sustained unless the party attacking it negates ev-
ery conceivable basis for supporting it, then this seriously erodes (if not destroys) any
test of equal protection. . . . For it is very difficult to prove the negative of something.
And proving the negative of every conceivable basis which would justify legislation
would appear impossible. The proof required amounts to showing that there could nct
have been any reasonable basis for the legislation. And this amounts to imagining all
the possible bases for the legislation and then showing that one's imagination was faulty,
that the bases imagined did not exist.
"It is clear from (this rationale) that the Court is unwilling to subject at least some
of the state's business and economic legislation to more than nominal scrutiny (if that
much) on equal protection grounds. This is consistent with the observations of Profes-
sors Tussman and tenBroek writing in 1949 that: 'There are broad areas in which the
Court's use of the equal protection clause can only be described as an abandonment of
it. . . ."' Blackman, The Implication of Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.:
Weakening or Eliminating Equal Protection for Corporations as a Class, 16 ARm. L.
REV. 41 (1974). In a recent obscenity case the Supreme Court has recognized the diffi-
culty of proving a negative. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973).
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when applied to equal protection cases was a clear signal of the Court's
abdication of review and uncritical deference to the legislative judg-
ment. The Warren Court did develop the so-called two-tiered sys-
tem, under which it revived the equal protection clause to give it real
application in cases involving a suspect classification or a fundamental
interest. 53 However, in cases where neither a suspect classification nor
a fundamental interest was present, the Rule worked its mesmerizism,
and judicial review under the equal protection clause was a virtual nul-
lity. As one constitutional scholar has put it, the Warren Court's appli-
cation of the Rule of Reasonableness meant that there would be "min-
imal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact . .. the 'mere ra-
tionality' requirement symbolized virtually judicial abdication. .... ,,54
Indeed, it was because the Rule had operated as a near total nullifica-
tion of the power of judicial review under the equal protection clause
that the Warren Court was forced to create the two-tiered approach.
If judges do not use the Rule of Reasonableness as a total abdica-
tion of the power of judicial review, the Rule can only operate as a
means to conceal the real reasons behind the judges' decisions. That
is, judges can use the Rule, either consciously or unconsciously, to mask
the policy considerations and value judgments which are the real basis
of their decisions. The rule becomes a pretext that can be used, like
other such pretexts, to manipulate substantive results. Platitudinizing
over rationality and judicial deference to the legislature is easier and
less politically precarious than facing up to making decisions about dif-
ficult constitutional issues.
The 'liberals' of the 1930's and the 1940's could plead piously for
the need of 'judicial self-restraint' precisely because their battle had
already been won, both in the legislatures and in the 'public con-
sensus.' ,It is easy, if somewhat sophistical, to insist that the func-
tion of the Court is to defer to the legislature in economic matters
when the legislature is performing exactly as the Court majority
would wish. Yet the liberals applied to their role no such self-re-
straint in the realm of civil liberties. That battle had not been
won. 55
But -using the Rule of Reasonableness to conceal value judgments
is dishonest if done consciously, and negligent if done subconsciously.
Moreover, it destroys understanding and predictability of the law by ob-
scuring the real reasons upon which decisions are rendered. There is
also a risk that the Rule will come back to haunt the judge who facilely
53. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
54. Gunther, supra note 2, at 8, 19.
55. Miller and Howell, supra note 2, at 678.
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uses it to conceal the considerations that really influenced his or her
decision. In one case the Rule might be employed as a mask for "lib-
eral" value judgments, when in a later case seemingly calling for ,the
Rule's application, it will work in favor of "conservative" value judg-
ments. The justices who, in defusing the New Deal Court crisis, used
the Rule of Reasonableness to refuse to review and thereby uphold
"liberal" legislation soon found that very same Rule standing in their
way when they were called upon to review "conservative" legislation.
There is no justification for the use of an artificial doctrine that obscures
the true nature of the judicial process by substituting spurious bromides
for reasoned analysis.
The Rule of Reasonableness can only result either in abdication
of judicial review or harmful concealment of the decision-making proc-
ess. There may be some superficial appeal to the theory that legisla-
tion should not be deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court un-
less shown to be clearly unreasonable, but constitutionality cannot be
measured in such quantitative degrees, and judicial review is only pos-
sible when the courts are willing to make value judgments that tran-
scend the concept of reasonableness. To pretend otherwise is to evade
or conceal the responsibility of judicial review.
An Analysis of the Reasonable Relationship Test
and a Reply to Professor Gunther
Recently, Professor Gerald Gunther has proposed a model of a
more specialized version of the Rule of Reasonableness that he suggests
the Supreme Court should adopt in cases that arise under the equal
protection clause.5 6 Professor Gunther submits that the Court should
readjust its two-tiered test of strict and minimal (or no) scrutiny for
equal protection cases.5 7  According to the Gunther model, the Court
in all cases would forego review of the ends or purposes of a legislative
classification but would continue to review, on a less differentiated two-
tiered approach, the reasonableness of the relationship between the
legislative classification (or means) and its purposes.58 In cases involv-
ing suspect classifications or fundamental interests, Gunther would per-
mit the Court to apply strict scrutiny to the reasonableness of the rela-
tionship between classification and purpose, requiring the classification
to be a "necessary" or the "least restrictive" means of accomplishing
56. Gunther, supra note 2.
57. The two-tiered approach is described in test accompanying notes 31-33 supra,
58. unther, supra note 2,
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the legislative purpose.5 9 In all other cases, Gunther would have the
Court apply a less srict, but not minimal, scrutiny, requiring only that
the classification have a "substantial" relationship to legislative purpose,
or, to put it another way, by allowing the state to select any legislative
classification that "substantially furthers legislative purpose." 60  Profes-
sor Gunther claims that his model would "close the wide gap" of the
Warren Court's two-tiered approach by abandoning review of legislative
ends in all cases while at the same time retaining strict scrutiny of
means in some cases and in other cases increasing the scrutiny of means
"from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.""'
Unfortunately, the consequences that the Gunther model would
lead to are the same as those of Professor Bickel's Rule of Reasonable-
ness: either virtually total abdication of the power of judicial review
or concealment of the real reasons upon which constitutional decisions
are based. Like Professor Bickel, Professor Gunther wants his model
to be used so that the Supreme Court will be done with "legislating'
and "making value judgments." Gunther repeatedly refers to his
model as a device to "avoid" judicial review in that "uncertain realm
of ultimate constitutional values. 62  l He reiterates continually the
theme that his model should be adopted so that the Court will avoid
"policy-making. '6  This would make it impossible for the Court to en-
gage in the kind of analysis that is essential for there to be meaningful
constitutional review. 64  If the Court did not engage in policy-making
by evaluating legislative purposes, the Court's function would be se-
verely restricted. Every law by its very nature is discriminatory in
that every law sets up some classification or category. However, not
every law discriminates unjustly. Whether the discrimination is unjust
or not can only be determined by evaluating the purpose of the law
and weighing the purpose against the disadvantages caused by the dis-
59. Id. at 24.
60. Id. at 21.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id. at 28.
63. "The yardstick for the acceptability of the means would be the purposes chosen
by the legislature, not 'constitutional' interests drawn from the value perceptions of the
justices." Id. at 21.
"The avoidance of ultimate value judgments about the legitimacy and importance
of legislative purposes would make the means-focused technique a preferred constitu-
tional ground for a less interventionist Court." Id. at 21-22.
"The major limitation on the exercise of scrutiny would stem from particularized
considerations of judicial competence, not from broad a priori categorizations of the 'so-
cial and economic' variety." Id. at 23.
64, See text accompanying notes 37-55 supra.
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crimination. Any sort of meaningful review under the equal protection
clause is not possible unless there is evaluation of legislative purposes
or ends. Under the Gunther model, many of the equal protection de-
cisions of the last twenty years striking down discriminatory legislation
would have been impossible. Indeed, Professor Gunther's model, car-
ried to its logical extreme, would have barred the Court's decisions
against discrimination based upon suspect classifications or affecting
fundamental interests. If, for instance, the Court had been powerless
to decide that racial separation is not in itself a valid legislative purpose,
then the Court would have been forced to accept racial classifications
as reasonably related to the purpose of segregation. According to the
Gunther model the Court would be bound to accept passively every leg-
islative purpose. At best the Court would function as a mere reviser
or editor of legislative phrasing to make certain that it was worded in
terms reasonably related -to the legislative purpose; at worst the Court
would be an automatic rubber stamp for legislation. Without evalua-
tion of legislative purposes, little, if any, judicial review is possible. By
following the Gunther model and foresaking policy evaluation of legis-
lative purposes, the Supreme Court would be abdicating its authority
of judicial review in the vast majority of equal protection cases.
Furthermore, the Gunther model, being a slightly more sophisti-
cated version of the Rule of Reasonableness, has the additional infir-
mity of possessing the potential to conceal the policy judgments that
are the real basis of the Supreme Court's decisions in a slightly more
subtle manner making it more difficult to ferret out exactly what the
Court is doing. By manipulating logic the Court can set forth a putative
statutory purpose65 and then easily proceed to show that the statutory
classification is not reasonably related to that particular statutory pur-
pose.6 This technique conceals the fact that the statutory classification
may be reasonably related to some other statutory purpose which the
Court believes, for unexpressed policy considerations, to be improper
or not weighty enough to justify the resulting discrimination.Y Since
most, if not all statutes are related to a variety of purposes, it is not
65. In using the phrase "statutory purpose," I am referring to not only the legisla-
five statement of purpose (if any), but also any effect that can be shown to be caused
by application of the statute. However, this definition of statutory purpose is not a nec-
essary ingredient of the analysis of equal protection presented in the text. While I submit
that the definition is valid, indeed more valid than less broad definitions of statutory
purpose, nevertheless the analysis in the text is not dependent upon the definition.
66. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE LJ. 123
(1972).
67. Id.
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at all difficult for a court to select some purposes and ignore others in
order to establish or to eliminate a reasonable relationship to the statu-
tory classification. But lurking behind such manipulation of logic is the
Court's approval or rejection of legislative purposes; ,that is, the Court's
essential policy-making function that can be hidden but never abro-
gated.
The inadequacy of evaluating only legislative means or classifica-
tions and not purposes is perhaps most blatantly apparent in the kind
of factual situation presented by a group of cases typified by REA v.
New York 6s or the more recent case of James v. Strange.6 9 In REA,
a 1949 case, the Supreme Court through an egregious application of
the Rule of Reasonableness rejected an equal protection attack against
a municipal ordinance that prohibited advertising upon vehicles but ex-
cepted from the prohibition advertising for one's own business upon de-
livery vehicles. In James, a 1972 case, the Court struck down as vio-
lative of equal protection a statute providing for recoupment of state
funds used to pay the legal fees of indigent defendants but did not pro-
vide for recoupment exemptions, such as garnishment limitations, that
were afforded to other civil judgment debtors. In both cases there ex-
ists what might be called a primary purpose (that we will assume is
valid) for the legislation-traffic safety in REA and reimbursement of
public funds in James-and there may or may not be a valid subsidiary
purpose in selecting a particular class of persons to bear the burden
of accomplishing the primary purpose. If the statutes were to be evalu-
ated only in terms of their primary purposes, the statutes in both cases
would be unjustly discriminatory, because there is no reason for the leg-
islature to pick only the designated classes in order to accomplish the
primary purpose. There is no reasonable relationship between the pri-
mary legislative purpose and the legislative classification. However,
such an analysis would be overly simplistic in that it ignores the possible
subsidiary purposes of the legislation, without which the cases cannot
be properly decided. For example, in his concurring opinion in
REA, 70 Justice Jackson suggested that self-sufficiency in business is a
68. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
69. 407 U.S. 128 (1972). See also Geduldig v. Aiello, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 2485
(1974); Fuller v. Oregon, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 2116 (1974); Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305
(1966); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957); but see Jiminez v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 2496 (1974).
70. 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949).
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goal which the state may encourage by affording an advantage to per-
sons advertising their own business over those who engage in advertis-
ing "for hire. '71 In Strange, it might be contended that indigent de-
fendants are not entitled to the same exemptive protection as other
debtors because they should be penalized for putting the state to this
kind of expense. Whether these state purposes are valid or not is be-
side the point being suggested here: that the cases cannot be properly
decided unless the Court critically evaluates the validity of all the pur-
poses to which the statute might be directed. If, in REA, the Court
had stated that the statute violated the equal protection clause because
the classification was not reasonably related to -the legislature purpose
of reducing traffic accidents, the Court would by implication be decid-
ing that the subsidiary purpose suggested by Justice Jackson was in-
valid. In other words, the Court would be masking, consciously or un-
consciously, its evaluation of a legislative purpose. In order to make
a proper analytical decision, the Court must be able to pass upon leg-
islative purpose. Every legislative classification is reasonably related
to some purpose, but not necessarily to a valid purpose or to a purpose
that outweighs the discriminatory deprivation which it causes. If the
Court cannot evaluate all legislative purposes, it necessarily will not be
capable of making fully analytic, well-reasoned decisions.
The above points are dramatized by the following example: Sup-
pose that a city, after a scientific investigation, determines that in order
to reduce its air pollution to an acceptable level, driving in the city must
be reduced by fifty per cent. Several proposals are presented to city
officials to accomplish -the purpose of reducing air pollution. One pro-
posal would ban all city driving during certain hours except driving for
business purposes. Another proposal would ban all city driving during
certain hours by anyone under the age of twenty-one. A third proposal
would ban all city driving during certain hours for anyone whose last
name begins with the letters A through M. All of th.- proposals have
the same primary purpose (decreasing air pollution), but each has a
different subsidiary purpose in selecting a particular class to bear the
burden of accomplishing the primary purpose. Unless legislative pur-
pose is first fully evaluated, the reasonable relationship test is of little
help in reviewing the proposal because each proposal's classification is
reasonably related to some purpose (encouraging business, recognizing
seniority, disadvantaging "A's" to "M's"), but each classification may or
may not be reasonably related to a valid purpose that justifies the dis-
71. Id. at 113-15.
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crimination. 2 Only by completely reviewing and evaluating primary
and secondary legislative purposes will the Court be able to properly
pass upon the constitutionality of statutes challenged under the equal
protection clause. Even if the Court reviewed the relationship be-
tween legislative means and ends to require that the means be the
"least drastic," the review would be an empty ceremony unless there
also was full review and evaluation of the legislative purposes. By
eliminating full review of legislative purposes, the Gunther model leads
to incomplete reasoning that abdicates judicial review or to manipula-
tive reasoning that obscures the real meaning of constitutional deci-
sions. Like its Bickellian precursor, the Gunther model is a spurious
device that operates to pervert the adjudicatory process.
A Realistic Theory of Constitutional Adjudication
By whatever term is chosen tc( describe it, "policy-making" or
"value-judging" or "judicial-legislating," is a necessary component of
judicial review; without it, no court can engage in true judicial review.
It is this fact of life that the proponents of the various Rules of Reason-
ableness cannot tolerate. They would prefer some sort of sophisticated
natural law procedure whereby the judicial function operates as a neu-
tral calculating machine that applies reason devoid of values. But such
a vision is a pipedream, and the dreamers have never faced up to this
fact. They have never quite accepted the decision in Marbury v. Madi-
son 7 that the Supreme Court possesses the power of judicial review,
which necessarily entails the power of judicial legislating. It has
been suggested by at least two law professors that ever since the rise
of Legal Realism, members of the legal profession have been aware
of the legislative nature of the judiciary, and that perhaps it is time to
apprise the general public of -this well kept secret.7 4 Nevertheless it
seems that some members of the legal profession are not so aware of
the courts' legislative character-or, if they are aware of it, they cannot
intellectually accept its ramifications. When they do recognize that ju-
dicial decision-making is in essence little different from any other form
of decision-making, they are abashed at what they see as a dilemma:
72. The reasonable relationship test between legislative means and ends can be of
value and should be used after there has been full and complete review of legislative
ends. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
73. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
74. Miller and Scheflin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the Posi-
tive State, 1967 DuKE LJ. 273 (Part One), 522 (Part Two) (1967). See also Karst,
.yupra note 39,
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Why should significant policy-making be performed by a body as un-
democratic in nature as the Supreme Court? Their way out of the di-
lemma is to try to repudiate the underlying proposition; that is, to at-
tempt to limit the Court's policy-making function to exclude any sort
of decision-making that entails anything other than the operation of
pure logic. 75 Ironically, this way of dealing with the dilemma is itself
a strange twist of logic: a premise (that judicial review requires policy-
making) is recognized as true, which leads to a dilemma (why should
an undemocratic institution be invested with the authority to make pol-
icy?), which dilemma is solved by denying the proposition which in the
first instance was taken as correct and thereby giving rise to the di-
lemma. This kind of logic might be symbolized as: A equals B, B
is bad, therefore A does not equal B. And so it is that members of
the legal profession manifest their reluctance to admit the true nature
of the judicial process. Instead, they quest for some safe middle
ground whereby the Supreme Court would have a limited power of ju-
dicial review, but in exercising it would refrain from substituting its ju-
dicial value judgments for those of the legislature. Such a middle
ground does not exist. It is time that the dreamers face up to this fact,
and face up to the hard question of whether or not judicial review (par-
ticularly under the equal protection clause) is beneficial or not to our
society.
The various proponents of doctrines of rationality are apologists
for judicial review. They recognize the need for restraints upon the
legislature because a legislature that sits upon constitutional judgment
of its own acts poses a substantial risk of becoming a legislative tyranny
of the majority that contravenes constitutional provisions. But at the
same time the proponents of rationality cannot face up to giving the
power of constitutional review-an awesome power indeed-to a rela-
tively small number of persons who are unanswerable to the electorate
75. "(The progressive realists) held that a judge drawing on an arguable set of
value choices is acting no differently than any other policymaker. . . . Thus a legal
issue was depicted as similar in its essentials to other policy issues. . . . This equation
of legal and ordinary decision making led the progenitors of the scholarly tradition to
identify an apparent conflict with another root proposition of their creed: the overriding
virtue of the democratic political process. . . . [Ihey asked the question that spawned
the traditional mode of judicial criticism: What justifies allocation of important policy
decisions to nonelected members of the judiciary?. . . In order to answer the question,
Bickel's progressive realists found a way . . . (to narrow) the institutional role of the
courts. . . [J]udges can confine themselves more rigorously and dcpendably within the
contraints of strict reason. .. (Judges should) do no more than apply logic and reason
to policy issues. . . ." Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Su-
preme Court, 84 HARv. L REv. 769, 773-74 (1971).
[Vol. 2
and who, in their policymaking, are subject to all the foibles of human
nature. The proponents of -the Rule of Reasonableness recognize that
the Court's independence from the electorate can be the source of
either socially beneficial decisions or socially harmful decisions. There-
fore they seek judicial review that is devoid of value judgments, which,
unfortunately is an unattainable fantasy that leads to confusion, frustra-
tion and dishonesty.
The Rule of Reasonableness and all of its variations should be
abandoned as a method of constitutional adjudication. This does not
mean that the Supreme Court justices should not be especially delib-
erate in their review of legislation; nor would abolition of the Rule of
Reasonableness necessarily dictate that the justices should reach consti-
tutional issues that can be avoided by deciding cases on narrower
grounds. Whether such avoidance is proper is not related to the abo-
lition of the Rule of Reasonableness. However, the Rule itself should
be foresaken as a fallacious rationalization which causes the judicial
process to dysfunction. Even if it is believed that the Supreme Court
should be a passive rather than an active institution and should curtail
its exercise of judicial review (which is at best an arguable theory),
the Rule of Reasonableness is hardly the proper way to accomplish such
an objective.
When the Supreme Court relies upon the Rule of Reasonableness
to forego real review, it is much the same as if the Court had refused
to exercise its jurisdiction over a case. When the Court employs the
Rule to avoid review, there is -an exercise of jurisdiction in form, but
hardly in substance; the Court is hearing the case, but with its ears
closed. This approach is tantamount to a non-exercise of jurisdiction.
Ironically, Professor Gunther himself previously has taken the position
that the Supreme Court is justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction
only in two instances: when it decides the merits of a case upon non-
constitutional grounds or narrow constitutional grounds, or when the
case or controversy requirement of Article III is not met.70 As support
for that position, Professor Gunther goes on to invoke77 Chief Justice
Marshall's statement that the Court has "no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not
given."78 Gunther concludes with a denunciation of the practice of
76. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle
and Expedience in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16-18 (1964) (hereinafter
cited as Gunther, The Subtle Vices).
77. Id. at 19.
78. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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avoiding judicial review that could well apply to his own more recent
work:
[TIhere is an obligation to decide in some cases; there is a limit
beyond which avoidance devices cannot be pressed ... without
enervating principle to an impermissible degree .. . (Avoidance
devices) "lead either to a manipulative process, whose inherent, if
high-minded, lack of candor raises issues of its own, or to the
abandonment of principle. .... 79
The Rule of Reasonableness has been expecially harmful in its ap-
plication to cases arising under the equal protection clause, which in
recent times has come to be one of the most important constitutional
provisions for protection of individual liberties. However, due to the
application of the Rule of Reasonableness to an entire variety of equal
protection cases (that is, minimal scrutiny cases), there is in effect no
judicial review under the equal protection clause. The Gunther model,
by abandoning review of legislative purposes in all equal protection
cases, would further decrease the exercise of judicial review under the
equal protection clause. Currently, in a great many cases where leg-
islation is challenged before the Court as violative of equal protection,
the Court defers to the legislative judgment; the Court sits back and
does nothing, and the Gunther model would exacerbate this intolerable
situation.
How then should the Supreme Court go about analyzing equal pro-
tection cases? I would agree with professor Gunther that the two-
tiered approach to equal protection cases does need to be readjusted,
but not in the manner that Professor Gunther proposes. I would sug-
gest that if the equal protection clause is to be viable in all cases, as
it should be, ,the Supreme Court should in all instances engage in a
complete and realistic balancing of interests-a weighing of legislative
purposes against individual rights-and thereafter further evaluate,
where necessary, -the reasonableness of the relationship between the
legislative purposes and the classifications. In those cases in which -the
Court does conclude that -there is a valid state purpose that outweighs
individual interests, the Court should then proceed to determine
whether that purpose is reasonably related to the legislative classifica-
tion. The Court should require in all cases that the classification be
necessary or the least restrictive.80 Professor Gunther only would
apply this standard in strict scrutiny cases; in minimal scrutiny cases
79. Gunther, The Subtle Vices, supra note 76, at 25.
80. However, one might accept the model of equal protection review that has been
suggested up to this point, but not accept the "least restrictive" standard as part of that
model.
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he would permit the state to select any means that substantially fur-
thered the legislative purpose. But there is no justification to continue
even this slight gap between minimal and strict scrutiny; it is unwar-
ranted in any kind of case to allow a state to effectuate its purposes
in a manner that causes unnecessary discrimination and harm to indi-
vidual rights. To strike down legislation on the ground that its means
are not necessary to accomplish its purposes only puts the state in -the
position, as Professor Gunther describes elsewhere, of "going back to
the drawing board."s'- Therefore, the stricter standard of the "least re-
strictive" means should be adopted for all equal protection cases. And
it cannot be overemphasized that unless the Court first undertakes a
complete evaluation of legislative purposes, the reasonable relation-
ship test is meaningless and can only obscure or avoid proper constitu-
tional adjudication.
In a few very recent equal protection cases82 that formerly would
have been treated with minimal scrutiny, the Court has taken steps to-
ward abandoning -the Rule of Reasonableness. Only by engaging in
this kind of real review, unfettered by the Rule, will the Supreme Court
be able to make analytically sound decisions that restore the equal pro-
tection clause to the viability that it deserves as a constitutional provi-
sion.
Such a theoretical framework will not result in the Court finding
equal protection violations in every case or even a majority of the cases
presented to the Court. Those who are fearful of complete and mean-
ingful judicial review under the equal protection clause may well be
surprised to find that, even subject to such a full review, many legis-
lative classifications are justifiable by state interests. Some classifica-
tions that cause discrimination are sustainable by countervailing state
interests, others are not. Since the Court can expect to sustain much
legislation brought before it, it should not shirk its responsibility to pro-
vide a reasoned assessment that balances state interests against individ-
ual ones in order to determine whether or not the equal protection
clause has been violated.
Abandonment of the Rule of Reasonableness would abolish the
uncalled for distinction between strict and minimal scrutiny. It could
81. Gunther, supra note 2, at 22-3.
82. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); and see Gunther, supra note 2,
at 18-20, 25-37.
Winter 1975]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
also make it possible to redefine some of the concepts of suspect clas-
sification and fundamental interests as the justifiable result of the
bona fide balancing of interests. The concepts of suspect classifications
and fundamental interests would not be seen as manifestations of the
gap between strict and minimal scrutiny, but rather as shorthand
phrases that express the results of fully-reasoned decisions that have
become well-established as precedent.
If there is to be full and complete judicial review under the equal
protection clause, the one question raised is whether there should also
be full and complete judicial review under the due process clause. Is
substantive due process to be resurrected from its grave? In answer
to this question it could be asserted that full and complete review under
the equal protection clause would provide sufficient protection to indi-
vidual rights so as to make substantive due process superfluous. Cer-
tainly there is some historical support for the proposition that the due
process clause is directed only to ensuring procedural fairness. But -this
historical support may be debated, and while history should not be
taken lightly, it hardly should be accepted as the controlling considera-
tion in determining the meaning of the Constitution. Moreover, there
is no valid reason to maintain the interment of substantive due process
under the death knell of the Rule of Reasonableness. The Rule is no
more justifiable in its application to the due process clause than it is
in its application to the equal protection clause or to any other constitu-
tional provision. If substantive due process is to remain interred, justi-
fication for its moribund condition will have to come from sources other
than the Rule of Reasonableness.
It is true that due to the generality of their wording, both the due
process and equal protection clauses provide a wider scope of judicial
review than other constitutional provisions. But this wide scope of re-
view is necessary so that the Court's authority will be coexistensive
with that of the legislature. Were it otherwise, there would be a large
body of legislation that entirely escaped judicial review. Moreover, it
is impossible to devise any constitution that could specifically enumer-
ate all of the values needed by a constantly evolving society. There-
fore, flexible constitutional provisions, such as the due process and
equal protection clauses, are necessary to allow judicial review that co-
equals legislative authority.
In fact, in a series of cases culminating in the recent abortion de-
cision,88 the Supreme Court has already taken a first step in reviving
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In the Roe opinion the Court discusses
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substantive due process by establishing that there is a right of privacy
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty."84 Unfortunately, in reaching -the holding in its abortion decision,
the Court relied upon the position that "only personal rights that can
be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'
. . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."8 5 So, unless
the reasoning in the abortion case is a false start, it seems that any trend
toward the return of substantive due process will follow the Warren
Court's -two-tiered approach to equal protection cases, with the Rule of
Reasonableness playing the same devious role when fundamental in-
terests are not deemed -to be present. However, it is important -to note
that as Professor Gunther correctly points out, in some recent equal
protection cases a new majority of the Supreme Court has departed
from the old two-tiered approach by providing real review even in min-
imal scrutiny cases. 86 This trend may be extended to all equal protec-
tion cases by a 'thorough rejection of the Rule of Reasonableness, and
the Court's treatment of substantive due process may follow the same
path.
The suggested revival of substantive due process, as well as 'the
model proposed here for full and complete equal protection review, no
doubt will be greeted by alarm prompted by memories of the New Deal
Court crises.8 7 Such alarm is a manifestation of the inability to accept
the dualistic uncertainty of judicial review; that if the Supreme Court
is granted the power of judicial review, it can exercise it rightly or
wrongly. There is no way to assure that the Court will always make
the correct or the popular decision, but if it is believed that judicial
review is necessary 'to protect individual rights from legislative en-
croachment, then the risks of judicial review must be taken. Yes, the
Court, just like the legislature or the executive will make its mis-
takes-it will make them under the due process clause, the equal pro-
tection clause, and every other constitutional provision. But the Court
will also make correct decisions that protect constitutional rights of
which other branches of the government are not so solicitous. Sup-
posedly judicial review is an authority -that 'the Court possesses, and it
is an authority that should be exercised to enforce the Constitution, to
the series of cases from which the right of privacy emerges. See also Bender, supra note
35.
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
85. Id. at 152.
86. Gunther, supra note 2, at 18-20, 25-37.
87. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
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make it a living Constitution, not a dead one. The Rule of Reasonable-
ness in all of its variations is nothing more than a spurious rationaliza-
tion by which the power of judicial review is covertly abdicated or con-
cealed. Whether interpreting the equal protection clause, the due
process clause, or other constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court
owes the nation fully reasoned and analytically sound judicial review
through a rejection of the Rule of Reasonableness.
